המרכז לפיתוח ע"ש פנחס ספיר ליד אוניברסיטת תל-אביב

כל מידע

פעילות מרכז ספיר בשנה"ל תשע"א (2010–2011)

ועידה בינלאומית בנושא: "Frontiers in Economics of Education"

הועידה נערכה ב-21-23 ביוני 2010 בביה"ס לכלכלה ע"ש איתן ברגלס, אוניברסיטת תל אביב ועסקה בנושאים הנמצאים בחזית המחקר בתחום כלכלת חינוך.

הנושאים שנדונו בועידה:

- השכלה גבוהה: בחירת תחומי לימוד ומוסדות לימוד, כיצד מצב המשק משפיע על שוק ההשכלה הגבוהה, הקשר בין המבנה המוסדי לבין תפוקות המערכת. מגבלות נזילות והסיכוי לרכישת השכלה גבוהה, השכלה ממיינת.

- השוק לחינוך: היצע ההשכלה ושיווי משקל כללי, השוק להוראה ושיטת תגמול, השפעה של בחירה חופשית ומידע על תפוקות ויעילות המערכת.

- פונקצית הייצור בחינוך: הקשר שבין תשומות לתפוקות, השפעת העמיתים, יעילות בייצור החינוך.

- אחר איותיות בחינוך (accountability): השפעת תמריצים על תפוקות בחינוך.

מארגנות הועידה: ד"ר אנליה שלוסר וד"ר טלי רגב מבית הספר לכלכלה, אוניברסיטת תל אביב.

בועידה השתתפו אנשי אקדמיה מובילים בתחום מהארץ ומחו"ל.

להלן רשימת משתתפי הועידה:

Josh D. Angrist	MIT
David Atkin	Yale University
Michal Beller	Israeli National Authority for Measurement and Evaluation in Education (RAMA)
Susan M .Dynarski	University of Michigan
David Figlio	Northwestern University
Dan Gibton	Tel Aviv University
Eric Gould	Hebrew University
Victor Lavy	Hebrew University
Kevin Lang	Boston University
Shaul Lach	Hebrew University
Sandra S. McNally	London School of Economics

5.1

Zvika Neeman	Tel Aviv University
Philip Oreopoulous	University of Toronto
Daniele Paserman	Boston University and Hebrew University
Parag Pathak	MIT
Patrick Puhani	University of Hannover
Miguel Urquiola	Columbia University
Tali Regev	Tel Aviv University
Steven Rivkin	Amherst College
Miikka Rokkanen	MIT
Jonah Rockoff	Columbia University
Yona Rubinstein	Brown University
Analia Schlosser	Tel Aviv University
Yuli Tamir	President of Shenkar College of Engineering and Design
Asaf Zussman	Hebrew University

ערבי עיון:

השתתפו	תאריך	שם ערב העיון
פרופ׳ דני בן –דוד מר אהרון פוגל ד״ר קרנית פלוג מנחה: פרופ׳ ליאו ליידרמן	3.1.2010	״יעדים כלכליים וחברתיים לישראל בעשור החדש : 2010-2019״ ערב עיון לזכרו של אמנון בן נתן בשיתוף עם הקתדרה לכלכלה וקרן מלגות ע״ש אמנון בן-נתן
פרופ׳ פרנסואה הילברון ד״ר מוניק בראל פרופ׳ דניאל כהן פרופ׳ ליאו ליידרמן	9.5.10	ערב עיון בנושא: "Thoughts on the crisis and after crisis: economic and market implications" בשיתוף עם אגודת ידידי אוניברסיטת תל אביב בצרפת
פרופ׳ ליאו ליידרמן פרופ׳ יעקב בודוך פרופ׳ אלכס צוקרמן פרופ׳ אסף רזין	6 ביוני 2010	ערב עיון בנושא: ״לקחים מהמשבר הפיננסי הגלובלי״
פרופ׳ יולי תמיר פרופ׳ ג׳וש אנגריסט פרופ׳ מיכל בלר ד״ר דן גיבתון פרופ׳ קווין לאנג	22.6.10	ערב עיון בנושא: "Challenges and Research in Education Policy" במסגרת הועידה הבינלאומית שנערכה ב-21-23 ביוני 2010

5.1

ניירות הדיון נמצאים באתר האינטרנט של מרכז ספיר שכתובתו : http://sapir.tau.ac.il

להלן התקצירים של ניירות הדיון :

"A Simple Model of Search Engine Pricing" Ran Spiegler and Kfir Eliaz, January 2010	1-10
We present a simple model of how a monopolistic search engine optimally determines the average quality of firms in its search pool. In our model, there is a continuum of consumers, who use the search engine's pool, and there is a continuum of firms, whose entry to the pool is restricted by a price set by the search engine. We show that a monopolistic search engine may have an incentive to set a relatively low price that encourages low-relevance advertisers to enter the search pool. This conclusion is independent of whether the search engine charges a price per click or a fixed access fee. KEYWORDS: search engines, internet, two-sided markets, sequential search.	

5.1

"Buying Shares and/or votes for corporate control" Eddie Dekel and Asher Wolinsky, February 2010	2-10
We revisit questions concerning the implications of voting rights for the efficiency of corporate control contests. Our basic set-up and the nature of the questions continue the work of Grossman and Hart (1988), Harris and Raviv (1988) and Blair, Golbe, and Gerard (1989). We focus on the effect on efficiency of allowing votes to be traded separately of shares in three cases. In addition to outright offers for shares (and for votes when such offers are permitted) we allow the parties competing for control rights to make either offers contingent on winning or quantity restricted offers. Our main conclusion characterizes when allowing vote buying is harmful, and such situations exist for efficiency in all the cases. Allowing quantity restricted offers is also harmful to efficiency (whether or not vote buying is allowed). However, allowing conditional offers is not in itself detrimental to efficiency. These sharp observations are no longer true if we look at the payoff to the initial shareholders alone (ignoring of the benefits of control). In particular, there are parameters for which allowing separate vote trading increases shareholder profits, despite being harmful for efficiency. The paper also makes a methodological contribution to the analysis of takeover games with a continuum of shareholders. It suggests a way of dealing with the mixed strategies that are crucial for the analysis, develops arguments that facilitate characterization results without fully constructing the set of equilibria and deals fully with the question of existence.	
"Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information" David Wettstein, Geoffrey de Clippel, David Perez Castrillo, March 2010	3-10
We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pauzner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible. JEL classification: D62, C71.	

Keywords: Pareto Efficiency, Egalitarian Equivalence, Asymmetric Information.	
"Paygo or Funded Social Security? A General Equilibrium Comparison" Itzhak Zilcha, Michael Kaganovich, March 2010	4-10
Social security systems in most developed economies are facing sustainability challenge due to demographic trends. Therefore social security reform proposals are on the agenda in many countries. This paper demonstrates that the analysis of fiscal sustainability of social security must include an additional dimension of public policy, namely education funding, which affects the productivity growth of future workers. This fact is true under both pay-as-you-go (PAYG) and fully funded (FF) social security system. While FF systems are known to be more conducive of national saving, some economists have conjectured that PAYG system have an advantage of an "intergenerational compact" leading to a relatively stronger political support for public education funding. This paper demonstrates that the latter conjecture may not be true in a closed economy framework. We consider an OLG economy where government, in addition to running social security, also funds education of future workers by means of taxes collected from the current ones. The education tax rates are chosen, in each period, by a majoritarian rule among the relevant constituents. We demonstrate, under conditions plausible for developed economies, that while the FF system produces political support for relatively higher (compared to PAYG) education funding, hence higher rate of human capital accumulation, as well as relatively higher rates of physical capital accumulation and economic growth, Furthermore, we show that under some meaningful conditions the FF system also results in lower degree of agents' lifetime income inequality.	
"How Parental Leave Benefits and Job Protection Rules Affect Mother's Labor Market Success" Analia Schlosser, Rafael Lalive, Josef Zweimuller, March 2010	5-10
Parental leave policies encourage mothers of newborn children to stay home and take care of their children. Two key instruments of parental leave policies are duration of job protection and benefits payments. This paper studies the causal effects of these	

two policy instruments on mother's return to work decisions and their subsequent impact on mother's labor market performance in the medium-run. To examine these issues, we exploit three different policy reforms in Austria that altered various components of the parental leave system. The policy changes were abrupt and unpredicted providing us the unique opportunity to apply a regression discontinuity research design. We find that duration of parental leave benefits is central for mothers time spent at home after child's birth. Duration of the job-protected period while on leave also influences mother's decisions to return to work, but to a lower extent. Yet, prolonged work interruptions due to parental leave have surprisingly little effects on mothers' earnings and employment 5 years after birth. On the other hand, there seems to be a detrimental effect on earnings and employment for women of high earnings capacity when their work interruptions exceed the period of job-protected leave.

JEL Classification: J13, J18, J22

Keywords: Parental leave, family and work obligations, return to work, labor supply, earnings, family earnings gap.

"Talent Utilization and Search for the Appropriate Technology" Hosny Zoabi, Tali Regev, April 2010	6-10
This paper analyzes a model of economic growth which is propagated by matching between technologies and the talents they require. It shows that differences in productivity across countries are amplified by three dimensions of talent utilizations: first, the variety of different talents utilized; second, the density of a specific talent utilized; third, the quality of match in the economy. Assuming set up costs, the equilibrium number of technologies increases with productivity. A larger number of technologies enables a better matching between individuals' talents and requirements of technologies. In addition, the number of technologies affects the incentives individuals face to search for the appropriate technology. Finally, we discuss the link between search and development.	
"Fiscal and Migration Competition" Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka, June 2010	7-10

It is often argued that tax competition may lead to a "race to the bottom". This result may indeed hold in the case of factor mobility (such as capital). However, in this paper we emphasize the unique feature of labor migration, that may nullify the"race to the bottom" hypothesis. Labor migration is governed not only by net-of-tax factor rewards, but rather importantly also by the benefits that the welfare state provides. The paper analyzes fiscal competition with and without migration in a two-country, political-economy, model with labor of different skills. The paper assigns an active fiscal role for both the host and the source countries. It models the host country stylistically as a core EU welfare state, with tax financed benefits and migration policies, and the migration source country as an accession country (following the EU enlargement to 27 states), with its own welfare (tax-benefit) policy. We let these two asymmetric countries (in terms of their productivity) engage in fiscal competition. Using numerical simulations we examine how the migration and tax policies are shaped, and how they are affected by whether the skilled or the unskilled are in power. As the driving force behind migration is a productivity gap, we also analyze the implications of the productivity gap for the design of migration and tax policies.

5.1