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Daughters Impact on Their Fathers: A 19th Century Investigation

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Daughters Impact on Their Fathers: A 19th Century Investigation

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ABSTRACT: The economics literature has noted a strong connection between a man having daughters and a stance on feminist issues. In this paper, I ask whether having daughters impacted the tendency of British Members of Parliament (MPs), between 1867 and 1873, to vote in favor of women's suffrage in the House of Commons. I construct a unique dataset that combines demographic information on MP's constituencies as well as biographical information on the various MPs. Notably, the biographical information includes the number of sons and daughters each MP had, as constructed from historical records. I discuss in detail the history of women's suffrage in the UK. I also frame the debate that occurred in the House of Commons around the timing of these divisions in the context of other feminist changes occurring contemporaneously. I regress an MP's vote on women's suffrage in each of the 6 relevant decisions on their biographical and constituent characteristics. I do not find any consistent evidence that daughter's impacted their fathers' votes on women's suffrage. I do find evidence that more agricultural areas, as well as areas more associated with the Anglican church, were more likely to oppose women's rights. This is especially true after the secret ballot, discussed below, became law (or was clearly going to be passed). I then discuss limitations of my analysis, including the lack of use of pairings, and the timing of my analysis. I leave extensions for future research.

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1 Introduction

The “Representation of the People Act 1867,” also known as the Second Reform Act, greatly expanded the right to vote in England and Wales to many members of the male working class. One of the amendments to the bill, proposed by John Stuart Mill, was to replace the word “man” with “people” in suffrage requirements, which would have equalized voting rights between men and women. While Mill made a moving speech, complete with petitions supporting women’s right to vote, his amendment ultimately failed by a vote of 196 to 73 (not including tellers). While this amendment did not pass, it marked the beginning of Parliament considering bills that would enfranchise women. Indeed, the Parliament elected in 1868 took up the issue in 1870, 1871, 1872, and 1873. Women’s suffrage would remain a topic debated by Parliament until it was finally passed in 1918.

The economics literature has simultaneously noted a strong connection between a man having daughters and a stance on feminist issues. Washington (2008) finds that US congressmen vote more liberally on feminist issues when they have daughters. Glynn and Sen (2015) similarly find that judges with daughters are more sympathetic to feminist issues.

In this paper, I ask whether having daughters impacted the tendency of British Members of Parliament (MPs), between 1867 and 1873, to vote in favor of women’s suffrage in the House of Commons. The historical record of MP votes in various divisions comes from “Division Lists, 1836-1909”. This source is not widely available, and was accessible to me through the Harvard University library on microfiche (in person). Surprisingly, there is no unified historical record on who was the MP representing each constituency on each date. This has been confirmed by private communications with the House of Commons library. While general election results are well known and compiled, deaths, resignations, and promotions all led to individual MPs to leave their seat and be replaced in special elections. These are detailed in Craig, ed (1977). The only way I know to compile a complete list of MPs who could have voted on each division is to manually construct a series for each constituency and division from this book.

I construct a unique dataset that combines demographic information on MP’s constituencies as well as biographical information on the various MPs. Notably, the biographical information includes the number of sons and daughters each MP had, as constructed from historical records. In particular, I need the dates the MP lived, how many sons and daughters he had, and party affiliation. While the most basic information on each MP is easily accessible, demographic information on their children is not. I used a number of sources. The first is the Dictionary of National Biography. This data source has at least some information on all of the MPs, but does not necessarily include biographical information on less well-known MPs. The second is Burke’s Peerage. This data source covers British nobility extensively, but does not help with MPs of a non-noble descent. It includes lineages. Finally, I use the British Newspaper Archives. Given that we know the date of death of each MP, it is relatively easy to locate their obituaries in the newspapers. Perhaps surprisingly, not all obituaries of the time include information on the MP’s children, focusing instead

on his parents. This is consistent with a culture that values lineage. As such, it often required multiple obituaries before the relevant information was found.

Data on constituency characteristics came from two main sources. First, a wide variety of *county* level data is available by UK census year (1861, 1871, 1881, etc.) using Lee (1979) and Hechter (2001). Data includes information on population growth rates, the sex ratio, population density, income per capita, fraction of the labor force in agriculture, percent of the population belonging to the Church of England, and literacy rates.

I discuss in detail the history of women's suffrage in the UK. I also frame the debate that occurred in the House of Commons around the timing of these divisions in the context of other feminist changes occurring contemporaneously.

I regress an MP's vote on women's suffrage in each of the 6 relevant decisions on their biographical and constituent characteristics. I do not find any consistent evidence that daughter's impacted their fathers' votes on women's suffrage. I do find evidence that more agricultural areas, as well as areas more associated with the Anglican church, were more likely to oppose women's rights. This is especially true after the secret ballot, discussed below, became law (or was clearly going to be passed).

I then discuss limitations of my analysis, including the lack of use of pairings, and the timing of my analysis. I leave extensions for future research.

I proceed as follows. In section 2 I give an outline of the history of women's suffrage in the United Kingdom (UK). In section 3 I outline the process by which I built the dataset. In section 4 I perform the main statistical analysis and analyze the results. Section 5 discusses the results in more detail. I conclude in section 6.

2 History of Women's Suffrage in the United Kingdom

The information in the next 5 paragraphs, unless otherwise specified, comes from Johnston (2013). Prior to 1832, women's suffrage was illegal in the UK mostly by tradition and assumption, rather than explicit legislation, and as a result there were a few isolated cases of women voting. At the same time the first petition to grant women suffrage was introduced to Parliament.

As noted above, John Stuart Mill introduced an amendment to the 1867 great reform act to extend the franchise from "man" to "person". This move failed, and was referred to as a "humorous interlude". Perhaps the most important accomplishment of this attempt at expanding suffrage to women was the effect Mill's speech had: he succeeded in convincing Jacob Bright, hitherto opposed to women's suffrage, to support the cause (Fawcett, 1912, pg. 19). As discussed below, Bright became one of the major advocates of women's suffrage over the next decade.

Despite this attempt failing to pass, many women tried to register to vote anyway, by citing an 1850 act that stated that masculine words could be deemed to refer to women as well, unless

explicitly noted otherwise. However, an 1868 court case ruled that this act did not apply to the Parliamentary franchise. In 1869 women in England and Wales received the right to vote in local elections, which had been explicitly denied in 1835. In 1870 the right to vote and be elected to school boards was extended. However, due to restrictions on suffrage by taxpayer status, married women were generally excluded from these rights in favor of their husbands.

During the debate on the Third Reform Bill in 1884, MP Woodall introduced an amendment extending the right to vote to women, and noted the change in public perception and the fact that “[t]he time has long since gone since gone by when the proposal to enfranchise women was received with derision.” That said, the proposal didn’t pass. Three bills, known as the “Conciliation Bills” were proposed in 1910, 1911 and 1912, but did not pass. This setback increased the militancy from parts of the suffragettes, which in turn became the main focus of the debate on the 1913 suffrage proposal. The issue then rested during the Great War. Women’s suffrage was finally passed in 1918.¹

In this paper, I focus on the initial wave of attempts to grant women’s parliamentary suffrage, as they coincided both with granting suffrage in local elections as well as married women’s property rights. As such, there were dramatic advancements in women’s rights during this period, raising the question as to why some MPs would support women’s suffrage and some would not.

I next give a brief overview of the divisions analyzed. Unless otherwise specified, the source is discussions documented in the Women’s Suffrage Journals (various years).

The first division was over the 1867 amendment to the second Great Reform act proposed by John Stuart Mill, discussed above. This attempt to grant women the vote failed by a margin of 196 to 73 (not including tellers). The issue returned after the 1868 elections. On May 4th 1870 the second reading of a bill to grant women the right to vote passed by a margin of 124 to 91 (plus tellers). It is probable that this bill passed precisely because no one thought it would, and thus did not show up to vote. Indeed, the Prime Minister (PM) Gladstone said “I may say for most of my Colleagues as well as for myself, that we were both surprised and disappointed at the result of the debate on Wednesday last. We do not attempt to limit the freedom of anyone either in the official body or elsewhere; but, undoubtedly, there is a prevailing opinion, which I, for one, strongly entertain in common with all those who are sitting near me, that it would be a very great mistake to proceed with this Bill” (Hansard, 1870). Accordingly, Gladstone whipped up opposition and defeated the bill in the third reading the following week, on May 12th, by a margin of 220-94 (mostly due to increased turnout, rather than people changing their votes). Since the May 12th vote included more MPs, I use that division rather than the May 4th division.

One of the chief arguments made against women’s suffrage was that there was no secret ballot. As such, polling stations could turn rowdy on election, and indeed the army had to be called in

¹There were minor restrictions for women’s suffrage as compared with male suffrage, that would take until 1928 to fully equalize.

to keep the peace during the 1868 election. Many men viewed the precincts to be unladylike. However, by 1871 it was clear that a secret ballot law, which would allow for polling stations to remain calm, would eventually pass (as it did in 1872). Thus the 1871 division on women's suffrage came closer to passing, failing only 220-151. Indeed, Gladstone himself supported the bill, but perhaps too late to be of any use.

The issue arose again in 1872, supported by Jacob Bright. Here, I go into more depth on the actual debate that took place in the House of Commons in order to illustrate the thinking of politicians at the time. All the remaining information is from Becker, ed (1872). Bright argued that taxes do not differentiate by gender, but do by income. Why should laws, which must be followed by all, be different? While he acknowledged that expanding women's suffrage would be a major change, he argued that it was not much more so that the two Great Reform acts that had happened in the lifetime of most MPs (1832 and 1867). He also listed the grievances held by women that would only get proper attention should women have the right to vote. He argued that the Elementary Education Act gave "three pennyworth of education to girls, four to boys." He noted that women are taxed to fund universities, but could not be students. He argued that property rights for women were not fully respected and that shopkeepers would not do business with girls who may marry. Women had no rights over their children. He also brought up the Contagious Diseases Acts – which forced alleged prostitutes to be subjected to medical examinations and potentially hospitalized – and noted that when a similar bill was passed on sailors, they rebelled. Women did not have the power to rebel. Bright continued by negating arguments against women's suffrage. What of the claim that women are less logical than men? He had heard the same said of the Irish and Blacks in the USA, and that they had been enfranchised anyway, since enfranchisement guarantees justice. Furthermore, even if men are more logical, are women not more sober? He argued that women are less likely to be criminals and had more self control. Some claimed that women shouldn't be allowed to vote since they know nothing of law, diplomacy and war. Bright argued that if they eliminated from the voting registrars all people who don't know these topics, who will remain among the electors?

Bright also made other points. One of them was that the secret ballot not only made polling stations safer for women, but it also made men less accountable to their wives and daughters. He cited senior members of Parliament who were in favor of women's suffrage. In a rather embarrassing moment, he realized that the text of his proposed bill would only enfranchise single women (as married women had dubious property rights). Some opponents of suffrage argued that single women were the "failures of the sex", since they had not managed to marry. Bright rebutted this argument by mentioning some "honorable" widows.

Arguments against women's suffrage debated were varied. One MP argued that since only single women would be enfranchised, a small portion of the population, why was the matter even worth discussing? MP Bouvrie used the fact that "only" 250,000 women signed petitions, to say that most women were opposed, since there were 8 million adult women. Bouvrie dismissed many of

Bright's other claims. He negated arguments about property rights as laws were changing, and about rights over children because presumably Bright did not want the "Solomon" approach of dividing them. He then asked if Bright wanted universal male suffrage (Bright gestured no). If so, then perhaps universal female suffrage? This would be problematic as there were more women than men. Bouvrie noted that Bright had just implied that women were opposed to men in just about everything, so why should men want to give them power? Bouvrie got a good laugh from the Parliament by noting that the right to vote would lead to female MPs or even PMs. He also railed on Bright for wanting to allow women into medical and legal professions "so it would be necessary to pass an Act for the abolition of flirtation", which got another laugh. Baillie Cochrane echoed this sentiment when he "remembered an anecdote to the effect that when the Bank of England was founded one of the regulations provided that no Scotchman should be a member of the direction, the reason being that if one Scotchman became a director all of the other directors would soon be Scotchmen". Other MPs argued that women really only wanted the vote to oppose the Contagious Diseases Acts.

MP Heron was in favor of women voting, due to the theory that all persons entitled by property shall be allowed to vote. He noted that women vote in municipal elections, Poor Law guardians, churchwardens, members of public companies, school boards (and are proficient members of boards), and that women vote as proprietors on Bank of England Stock. As such, he asked what is unfeminine about voting? Women work in mines and work on ocean steam vessels, which is surely not feminine.

MP Beresford Hope argued that the proposed bill was not as moderate as it seemed. It would enfranchise spinsters and widows with property on the grounds of the wronging women without property (married women). He therefore concluded that it would be wrong to assume that the "agitation" for women's rights would end with this bill. He believed that women's suffrage would increase the risk of war as women were "impulsively ready to risk claims and back up assertions which would be ever on the verge of culminating in bloodshed for the sake of honour and mistaken chivalry."

The Attorney General argued that, under common law, single women were no different than men and thus should be allowed to vote. He also claimed that native states in the east were run well only by women. He said that he does not argue or believe that women are as smart as men, but educated women at least as good as uneducated men. He claimed the good queens of England compared well to poorer kings (not better kings). He argued that it no more "flies in face of nature" to give women right to vote for parliament than for school board, which everyone seems to be fine with.

Echoing the ethos of the time, Sir Adderley argued that the point is to be discussed is whether property should be disenfranchised because it was held by a woman.

The last division included in this analysis was the 1873 division, that failed by a vote of 222-155.

3 Data

In this section, I describe the dataset I construct.

The historical record of MP votes in various divisions comes from “Division Lists, 1836-1909”. This source is not widely available, and was accessible to me through the Harvard University library on microfiche (in person). Surprisingly, there is no unified historical record on who was the MP representing each constituency on each date. This has been confirmed by private communications with the House of Commons library. While general election results are well known and compiled, deaths, resignations, and promotions all led to individual MPs to leave their seat and be replaced in special elections. These are detailed in Craig, ed (1977). The only way we know to compile a complete list of MPs who could have voted on each division is to manually construct a series for each constituency and division from this book.

The next step was to build a demographic dataset on individual MPs. In particular, I need the dates the MP lived, how many sons and daughters he had, and party affiliation. While the most basic information on each MP is easily accessible, demographic information on their children is not. I used a number of sources. The first is the Dictionary of National Biography. This data source has at least some information on all of the MPs, but does not necessarily include biographical information on less well-known MPs. The second is Burke’s Peerage. This data source covers British nobility extensively, but does not help with MPs of a non-noble decent. It includes lineages. Finally, I use the British Newspaper Archives. Given that we know the date of death of each MP, it is relatively easy to locate their obituaries in the newspapers. Perhaps surprisingly, not all obituaries of the time include information on the MP’s children, focusing instead on his parents. This is consistent with a culture that values lineage. As such, it often required multiple obituaries before the relevant information was found.

Data on constituency characteristics came from two main sources. First, a wide variety of *county* level data is available by UK census year (1861, 1871, 1881, etc.) using Lee (1979) and Hechter (2001). Data includes information on population growth rates, the sex ratio, population density, income per capita, fraction of the labor force in agriculture, percent of the population belonging to the Church of England, and literacy rates. Since 1871 is the closest census year to all of the divisions, I restrict attention to data from that year. Since this data is based on counties, and not constituencies, I use the “Vision of Britain” shape files to construct the historical boundaries of each constituency and county. Constituencies did not necessarily fall entirely in one county. I take the fraction of a constituency that fell into each county in order to take a weighted average of the county characteristics for each constituency.

4 Analysis

In order to analyze the impact of daughters on their father’s feminist voting tendency, I run regressions of the following form:

$$vote_{m,c}^b = \alpha \cdot conservative_m + \beta \cdot N_m^d + \beta \cdot N_m^d \cdot conservative_m + X_c' \cdot \gamma + Y_m' \cdot \delta + \epsilon_{b,m,c}, \quad (1)$$

where $vote_{m,c}^b$ is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if MP m from constituency c voted in favor of women's suffrage on division $b \in \{1867, 1870, 1871, 1872, 1873\}$. $conservative_m$ is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if an MP is from the Conservative party. N_m^d is the number of daughters MP m had. β captures the interaction effect between being a conservative MP and having more daughters. X is a vector of constituency-level variables, including the per capita income, the interaction between per capita income and the MP being conservative, the sex ratio, population density, the fraction of the labor force working in agriculture, the fraction of the labor force working in the agricultural sector, the fraction of the population belonging to the Church of England, and the fraction of the population that was illiterate. Y_m includes individual MP characteristics, including fixed effects for every age and fixed effects for the number of children. I restrict attention to cases where an MP cast a vote, rather than look at the propensity of MPs to vote. Standard errors are clustered by constituency.

Table 1 reports the results for the 1867 division. Column 1 includes as controls whether the MP was Conservative, the number of daughters he had, the interaction between number of daughters and being conservative, age fixed effects and fixed effects for the number of children. Column 2 repeats column 1 but includes the constituency controls contained in X . Columns 3 and 4 repeat columns 1 and 2, respectively, but restrict attention to MPs who have at least one child, and are thus parents. An MP being conservative reduces the probability that he will support women's suffrage by about 20-30 percentage points, but this effect is only statistically significant when not including constituency characteristics (that is, only in columns 1 and 3). No other variable is found to be significant. It is worth reemphasizing at this point that this division was the first on this topic, and came before the Second Great Reform act, and the election of 1868. As such, I do not read too much into the lack of results at this point.

Table 2 repeats the pattern of Table 1 for the 1870 division. As a reminder, this division was the third (and thus final) reading of a bill to grant women's suffrage, that came a week after the second reading passed unexpectedly. As such, it had higher attendance, since the PM Gladstone whipped up his supports to vote the bill down. Interestingly, in these data, I find that conservatives with daughters were significantly more likely to vote in favor of women's suffrage. Indeed, it is the only variable in this set of regressions that is consistently statistically significant. The estimates imply that, among Conservative MPs, having an extra daughter increased the probability of voting in favor of women's suffrage by 5-8 percentage points, and is statistically significant at the 5-10% level. This is indeed a large effect: having two daughters would increase the probability of voting for suffrage by 10-16 percentage points. However, as will be seen below, this effect is only present in this one division, reducing its credibility. There is some evidence that a more agricultural district is less likely to support women's suffrage.

Table 3 repeats the pattern of Table 1 for the 1871 division. There is some evidence that conser-

vatives from higher income districts were more likely to support women's rights, however this estimate is only significant at the 10% level in column 2. There is significant evidence that agricultural districts and districts associated with the Church of England are significantly less likely to support women's suffrage. This is presumably due to the more conservative attitudes associated with agricultural and religious areas.

Table 4 repeats the pattern of Table 1 for the 1872 division. Being a Conservative reduced the likelihood of supporting women's suffrage by approximately 30 percentage points. This estimate is statistically significant in all specifications except for in column 4. In that specification, the magnitude of the estimate is similar to the others, but is not significant due to a larger standard error. There is no significant effect of daughters on their father's voting patterns. As before, there is significant evidence that agricultural districts and districts associated with the Church of England are significantly less likely to support women's suffrage. There is evidence to suggest that the sex ratio (women/men) is positively associated with support of women's rights. On face value, this finding is similar to that of CITATION, who argue that western states, on the frontier, in the US granted women rights in order to lure more women. However, that mechanism wouldn't be appropriate for this analysis, as the rights to be granted were on a national level, and thus would not impact a specific region's ability to attract women.²

Table 5 repeats the pattern of Table 1 for the 1873 division. Qualitatively, the results are the same as for the 1872 division, with the exception being that there is evidence here that Conservatives from higher income districts were more likely to support women's suffrage. Being a Conservative reduced the likelihood of supporting women's suffrage by approximately 20-66 percentage points. There is no significant effect of daughters on their father's voting patterns. As before, there is significant evidence that agricultural districts and districts associated with the Church of England are significantly less likely to support women's suffrage. There is evidence to suggest that the sex ratio (women/men) is positively associated with support of women's rights.

5 Discussion

In this section, I discuss and interpret the results from section 4. I make three points. The first is that there seems to be little evidence to support the hypothesis that daughters impacted the voting patterns of their fathers. The second is that relationship between an agricultural or religious district and opposing women's rights only begins in 1871, and thus might be related to the secret ballot. Finally, I discuss the limitations of the analysis done here.

The 1870 division, with results reported in Table 2, is the only of the 6 divisions analyzed to find any impact of daughters on their fathers. Even here, it is not clear what the takeaway message should be: the point estimate on the impact of the number of daughters on their fathers' voting

²Unless, of course, regions were signalling their feminist attitudes through their parliamentary representation. However, for this to work, people would have to assume a large amount of sophistication and awareness of women on the voting patterns of representatives from different regions.

patten is *negative*, but not significant. The estimate on the interactions between daughters and conservative fathers is positive and significant. When testing whether the summation of the two estimates is significantly different from 0, the answer is that they are not. This reduces greatly confidence in the idea that daughters impacted their fathers during this particular division. Given the lack of results among the other divisions, I conclude that daughters did not impact their fathers' voting patterns.

Turning to the second point, in the 1870 division, there was some evidence that agricultural districts and religious districts were more opposed to women's suffrage. However, starting in the 1871 division (and thereafter), these effects were consistently significant. This is consistent with the idea that the secret ballot indeed affected politicians. One hypothesis is that, prior to the secret ballot, many men were opposed to women's suffrage out of sincere concern for their safety on election day. Once this concern was addressed, the remaining opponents of women's suffrage were ideological in nature, such as rural and religious people. I do not have a better way of assessing this hypothesis, and leave it for future research.

There are many limitations to the analysis done here. First, I only explore divisions at the very beginning of the suffrage movement. The connection between daughters and fathers' feminism may have changed later on, as the date of actual suffrage grew closer. Second, there are technical issues with the data. For instance, I do not include any data on "pairings". Pairings are when an MP cannot make the vote, so he asks an MP who is on the other side of the issue to not vote as well, such that the final outcome is unchanged. In some of the divisions, such as the 1872 division, data on pairings is available through the Women's Suffrage Journal. There were 18 pairs that year, indicating 36 MPs otherwise unrecorded votes. As a matter of interest, Benjamin Disraeli was in favor of women's suffrage, but did not vote on that division, and was balanced by John Hutton. I do not use these data CITATION. While on one hand, these data may allow for more complete and statistically significant results, they are not available for all divisions. The evidence documented hitherto in this paper do not suggest that more data would solve the central problem of a seeming lack of relationship between daughters and their fathers' voting patterns. As such, I do not both to update the data.

6 Conclusion

In this paper I explore the potential connection between having daughters and British MPs propensity to vote in favor of women's suffrage in the late 1860s and early 1870s. I do not find any connection. I discuss other potential relationships that exist in the data, as well as limitations with my own analysis.

I describe in detail a unique dataset I compile for this analysis. I leave for future work expanding on these (lack of) results to later divisions that came around the time of women's suffrage.

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Table 1: 1867

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	vote	vote	vote	vote
Conservative	-0.304*** (0.085)	-0.262 (0.241)	-0.335** (0.151)	-0.194 (0.345)
incpc1871		0.020 (0.018)		0.035* (0.020)
conser_inc		-0.002 (0.019)		-0.010 (0.026)
Num_daughters	0.014 (0.052)	0.022 (0.051)	-0.010 (0.068)	0.012 (0.071)
Num_daughter_conservative	-0.024 (0.041)	-0.021 (0.041)	-0.021 (0.060)	-0.034 (0.063)
sexratio1871		-0.295 (0.690)		0.164 (0.834)
popdens1871		0.002 (0.007)		-0.009 (0.010)
percag1871		-0.121 (0.224)		-0.209 (0.260)
percchurcheng1871		-0.136 (0.191)		-0.033 (0.240)
percillit1871		0.474 (0.544)		0.573 (0.719)
N	249	249	172	172
r2	0.418	0.432	0.475	0.507

Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses are clustered at the constituency level. “Conservative” is a dummy variable indicating that the MP was a member of the Conservative party. Incpc1871 is income per capita in the MP’s constituency, measured in 1871. “conser_inc” is the interaction between Conservative and income per capita. “Num_daughters” is the number of daughters the MP had. “Num_daughter_conservative” is the interaction between the number of daughters and the MP being Conservative. “sexratio1871” is the ratio of women to men in the MP’s constituency, measured in 1871. “popdens1871” is the population density of the MP’s constituency in 1871. “percag1871” is the fraction of agricultural employment in the MP’s district in 1871. “percchurcheng1871” is the fraction of people in the MP’s district belonging to the Church of England in 1871. “percillit1871” is the percent of the population who were literate in the MP’s district in 1871. All specifications include dummy variables for each possible number of kids that an MP had, and dummy variables for the age of the MP at the time of the division. Standard errors are clustered by constituency. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 2: 1870

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	vote	vote	vote	vote
Conservative	-0.087 (0.086)	-0.258 (0.208)	-0.187 (0.126)	-0.321 (0.256)
incpc1871		-0.016 (0.012)		-0.009 (0.015)
Conser_inc		0.016 (0.015)		0.012 (0.019)
Num_daughters	-0.028 (0.034)	-0.031 (0.034)	-0.040 (0.036)	-0.040 (0.037)
Num_daughter_Conservative	0.051* (0.027)	0.054* (0.028)	0.083** (0.036)	0.082** (0.038)
sexratio1871		-0.176 (0.601)		0.004 (0.746)
popdens1871		-0.003 (0.004)		-0.004 (0.006)
percag1871		-0.415** (0.187)		-0.353 (0.229)
percchurcheng1871		-0.227 (0.168)		-0.220 (0.209)
percillit1871		-0.410 (0.406)		-0.240 (0.499)
N	310	310	237	237
r2	0.226	0.258	0.272	0.291

Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses are clustered at the constituency level. “Conservative” is a dummy variable indicating that the MP was a member of the Conservative party. Incpc1871 is income per capita in the MP’s constituency, measured in 1871. “conser_inc” is the interaction between Conservative and income per capita. “Num_daughters” is the number of daughters the MP had. “Num_daughter_conservative” is the interaction between the number of daughters and the MP being Conservative. “sexratio1871” is the ratio of women to men in the MP’s constituency, measured in 1871. “popdens1871” is the population density of the MP’s constituency in 1871. “percag1871” is the fraction of agricultural employment in the MP’s district in 1871. “percchurcheng1871” is the fraction of people in the MP’s district belonging to the Church of England in 1871. “percillit1871” is the percent of the population who were literate in the MP’s district in 1871. All specifications include dummy variables for each possible number of kids that an MP had, and dummy variables for the age of the MP at the time of the division. Standard errors are clustered by constituency. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 3: 1871

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	vote	vote	vote	vote
Conservative	-0.098 (0.085)	-0.321* (0.184)	-0.107 (0.121)	-0.303 (0.229)
incpc1871		-0.001 (0.012)		0.005 (0.015)
Conser_inc		0.024* (0.014)		0.019 (0.016)
Num_daughters	-0.035 (0.036)	-0.036 (0.035)	-0.037 (0.039)	-0.040 (0.039)
Num_daughter_Conservative	-0.004 (0.031)	-0.006 (0.032)	0.004 (0.040)	0.008 (0.041)
sexratio1871		0.201 (0.596)		0.600 (0.778)
popdens1871		-0.000 (0.005)		0.001 (0.006)
percag1871		-0.688*** (0.171)		-0.598*** (0.199)
percchurcheng1871		-0.532*** (0.165)		-0.457** (0.203)
percillit1871		0.028 (0.457)		0.250 (0.539)
N	365	365	279	279
r2	0.179	0.238	0.230	0.280

Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses are clustered at the constituency level. “Conservative” is a dummy variable indicating that the MP was a member of the Conservative party. Incpc1871 is income per capita in the MP’s constituency, measured in 1871. “conser_inc” is the interaction between Conservative and income per capita. “Num_daughters” is the number of daughters the MP had. “Num_daughter_conservative” is the interaction between the number of daughters and the MP being Conservative. “sexratio1871” is the ratio of women to men in the MP’s constituency, measured in 1871. “popdens1871” is the population density of the MP’s constituency in 1871. “percag1871” is the fraction of agricultural employment in the MP’s district in 1871. “percchurcheng1871” is the fraction of people in the MP’s district belonging to the Church of England in 1871. “percillit1871” is the percent of the population who were literate in the MP’s district in 1871. All specifications include dummy variables for each possible number of kids that an MP had, and dummy variables for the age of the MP at the time of the division. Standard errors are clustered by constituency. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4: 1872

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	vote	vote	vote	vote
Conservative	-0.272*** (0.082)	-0.391** (0.181)	-0.309** (0.121)	-0.324 (0.254)
incpc1871		0.011 (0.012)		0.032** (0.014)
Conser_inc		0.013 (0.014)		0.004 (0.017)
Num_daughters	-0.044 (0.031)	-0.033 (0.030)	-0.035 (0.034)	-0.016 (0.033)
Num_daughter_Conservative	0.015 (0.032)	0.018 (0.032)	0.018 (0.043)	0.017 (0.040)
sexratio1871		0.736 (0.587)		2.035*** (0.717)
popdens1871		-0.005 (0.006)		-0.006 (0.007)
percag1871		-0.532*** (0.168)		-0.562*** (0.182)
percchurcheng1871		-0.550*** (0.157)		-0.706*** (0.180)
percillit1871		0.118 (0.423)		0.548 (0.466)
N	363	363	265	265
r2	0.224	0.271	0.312	0.403

Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses are clustered at the constituency level. “Conservative” is a dummy variable indicating that the MP was a member of the Conservative party. Incpc1871 is income per capita in the MP’s constituency, measured in 1871. “conser_inc” is the interaction between Conservative and income per capita. “Num_daughters” is the number of daughters the MP had. “Num_daughter_conservative” is the interaction between the number of daughters and the MP being Conservative. “sexratio1871” is the ratio of women to men in the MP’s constituency, measured in 1871. “popdens1871” is the population density of the MP’s constituency in 1871. “percag1871” is the fraction of agricultural employment in the MP’s district in 1871. “percchurcheng1871” is the fraction of people in the MP’s district belonging to the Church of England in 1871. “percillit1871” is the percent of the population who were literate in the MP’s district in 1871. All specifications include dummy variables for each possible number of kids that an MP had, and dummy variables for the age of the MP at the time of the division. Standard errors are clustered by constituency. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 5: 1873

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	vote	vote	vote	vote
Conservative	-0.214** (0.084)	-0.660*** (0.187)	-0.268** (0.120)	-0.574** (0.234)
incpc1871		-0.001 (0.012)		0.010 (0.013)
Conser_inc		0.040*** (0.015)		0.026 (0.017)
Num_daughters	-0.025 (0.034)	-0.011 (0.034)	-0.033 (0.036)	-0.023 (0.036)
Num_daughter_Conservative	0.009 (0.030)	0.004 (0.031)	0.023 (0.039)	0.024 (0.039)
sexratio1871		0.939 (0.590)		1.470** (0.733)
popdens1871		-0.001 (0.005)		-0.003 (0.005)
percag1871		-0.416** (0.178)		-0.381* (0.207)
percchurcheng1871		-0.305* (0.158)		-0.334* (0.197)
percillit1871		0.325 (0.429)		0.174 (0.517)
N	372	372	276	276
r2	0.228	0.270	0.323	0.368

Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses are clustered at the constituency level. “Conservative” is a dummy variable indicating that the MP was a member of the Conservative party. Incpc1871 is income per capita in the MP’s constituency, measured in 1871. “conser_inc” is the interaction between Conservative and income per capita. “Num_daughters” is the number of daughters the MP had. “Num_daughter_conservative” is the interaction between the number of daughters and the MP being Conservative. “sexratio1871” is the ratio of women to men in the MP’s constituency, measured in 1871. “popdens1871” is the population density of the MP’s constituency in 1871. “percag1871” is the fraction of agricultural employment in the MP’s district in 1871. “percchurcheng1871” is the fraction of people in the MP’s district belonging to the Church of England in 1871. “percillit1871” is the percent of the population who were literate in the MP’s district in 1871. All specifications include dummy variables for each possible number of kids that an MP had, and dummy variables for the age of the MP at the time of the division. Standard errors are clustered by constituency. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.