ניירות דיון 2024
WP 1-2024
The uneven effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on US fatal road accidents
Maya Fuks, Keith Gandal, Neil Gandal
Abstract
One of the lesser-known categories of excess deaths of the COVID-19 pandemic in the US was that of fatal car crashes went up despite the fact that driving decreased due to the lockdowns. Remarkably, then, while there was significantly less traffic in 2020 compared to 2019—the total miles traveled by car decreased by 11% in 2020—there was at the same time a 6.8% increase in fatal car crashes. This meant that the fatality rate per vehicle miles traveled increased by 21% from 2019 to 2020.
But the increase was not uniform: states that voted for Biden in 2020 had a much larger percentage increase in fatal car accidents per miles driven during the March to June 2020 period (the first four months of the pandemic) relative to the same period in 2019. In the case of states that voted for Biden, the average percentage increase in fatal car accidents per miles driven per state was 45 percent while the increase was just 22 percent in states that voted for Trump. During the next four months of the pandemic (July – October 2020), when COVID-19 was less prominent in the news and lockdowns had eased, the differences in the percentage increase in fatal car accidents per miles driven between Biden and Trump states was much smaller: 29% for Biden states versus 25% for states that voted for Trump.
Using regression analysis, we show that a higher percentage vote for Biden in 2020 is associated with a statistically significant increase in fatal accidents per vehicle miles travelled during the first four months (March – June 2020) of the pandemic relative to the same period in 2019. On the other hand, there is no statistical difference between the next four months of the pandemic (July-October 2020) relative to 2019.
WP 2-2024
Clerks
Kfir Eliaz, Daniel Fershtman, Alexander Frug
Abstract
We study the optimal dynamic scheduling of workers to tasks when task-completion is privately observed (hence, workers can delay the release of completed tasks), and when idle time is the only means of providing incentives. Our main result characterizes a scheduling rule, and the equilibrium it induces, maximizing the expected discounted output subject to workers’ incentive constraints. When workers are inherently slow, a simple rotation scheme suffices to attain first-best output, but when they are more productive, optimal scheduling alternates between phases with and without delay. Our analysis highlights a trade-off between the quality and size of workforce.
WP 3-2024
Revisiting U.S.Wage Inequality at the Bottom 50%
Oren Danieli
Abstract
I propose a model of a skill-replacing routine-biased-technological-change (SRRBTC). In this model, technology substitutes the usage of skill in routine tasks, in contrast to standard RBTC models which assume technology replaces the workers themselves. The SR-RBTC model explains three key trends that are inconsistent with standard RBTC models: why specifically middle-wages declined even though routine workers are dispersed across the entire bottom half of the wage distribution, why middle-wages stopped declining while the technological change continued, and why there is no substantial decline in the average wage of routine workers. I derive two new testable predictions from the model: a decrease in return to skill, and a decrease in skill level in routine occupations. I use an interactive-fixed-effect model to confirm both predictions. Since SR-RBTC violates the ignorability assumption required by standard decomposition methods, I introduce “skewness decomposition” to show that SR-RBTC is the main driver of bottom-half inequality trends.
WP 4-2024
Search, Dating, and Segregation in Marriage
Yair Antler, Daniel Bird, Daniel Fershtman
Abstract
We study statistical discrimination in a marriage market where agents, characterized by attractiveness (e.g., wealth) and background (e.g., race, ethnicity), engage in time consuming search. Upon meeting, couples date to learn about their match’s quality. Following Phelps (1972), different backgrounds impede such learning. We show that even absent any bias, equilibrium features segregation. Moreover, welfare improvements enhance segregation. In particular, radical improvements in search technologies induce complete segregation and a “dating apocalypse” where agents replace partners frequently. We show that, in line with empirical findings, segregation is decreasing in couples’ attractiveness, and provide conditions for (probabilistic) positive sorting by attractiveness.
WP 5-2024
The Intergenerational Effects of Women’s Rights
David Weiss
Abstract
How does women’s empowerment affect children’s education, and eventual adulthood outcomes? What are the intergenerational implications of women’s empowerment on grandchildren? In one of the most dramatic shifts of economic power in human history, common law countries began giving economic rights to married women in the second half of the 19th century. Before this “women’s liberation,” married women were subject to the laws of coverture. Coverture had detailed regulations as to which spouse had ownership and control over property and income, granting the husband virtually unlimited power within the household. So great was the husband’s power that a common saying was that “man and wife are one, but the man is the one” (Williams, 1947).1 I explore the ramifications of coverture’s demise on children. I use the complete count U.S. Census from 1850 to 1920 (Ruggles et al., 2023) and two separate identification strategies to show that women’s legal empowerment increased school enrollment of children immediately. I then link these data to the 1940 census to see how this extra education affected their earnings, probability of getting married (and who they marry), as well as how many children they have of their own and how much they educate them. In other words, I explore how granting women rights had an intergenerational impact upon the grandchildren of the a women who received rights.
WP 6-24
Similarity Nash Equilibria in Statistical Games
Rossella Argenziano and Itzhak Gilboa
Abstract
A statistical game is a game in which strategic interaction is mediated via a binary outcome y , coupled with a prediction problem where a characteristic x of the game may be used to predict its outcome y based on past values of (x, y) . In Similarity Nash Equilibria, players combine statistical and strategic reasoning, using an estimate of y as a coordination device. They predict y by its similarity- weighted frequency and learn the optimal notion of similarity from the data. We prove that the model captures the importance of precedents and the endogenous formation of sunspots
Published in: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2023, 15(3): 354–386
